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Losing Your Marbles in
Wavefunction Collapse Theories1
Rob Clifton and Bradley Monton
ABSTRACT
Peter Lewis ([1997]) has recently argued that the wavefunction collapse the-
ory of GRW (Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber [1986]) can only solve the problem
of wavefunction tails at the expense of predicting that arithmetic does not
apply to ordinary macroscopic objects. More specifically, Lewis argues that
the GRW theory must violate the enumeration principle: that ‘if marble 1
is in the box and marble 2 is in the box and so on through marble n, then
all n marbles are in the box’ ([1997], p. 321). Ghirardi and Bassi ([1999])
have replied that it is meaningless to say that the enumeration principle is
violated because the wavefunction Lewis uses to exhibit the violation cannot
persist, according to the GRW theory, for more than a split second ([1999],
p. 709). On the contrary, we argue that Lewis’s argument survives Ghirardi
and Bassi’s criticism unscathed. We then go on to show that, while the enu-
meration principle can fail in the GRW theory, the theory itself guarantees
that the principle can never be empirically falsified, leaving the applicability
of arithmetical reasoning to both micro- and macroscopic objects intact.
1 Wavefunction Collapse Theories and the Tails Problem
2 Lewis’s Counting Anomaly
3 Can the Counting Anomaly Be Avoided?
4 Is the Counting Anomaly Ever Manifest?
5 Is Suppressing the Manifestation of Anomalies Enough?
1Forthcoming in The British Journal for Philosophy of Science, December 1999.
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1 Wavefunction Collapse Theories and the Tails
Problem
The standard Schro¨dinger dynamics for a quantum system prescribes that its
state vector |ψ(t)〉 always evolves in time deterministically, and linearly (i.e.,
that |ψ(t)〉’s evolution is the sum of the separate evolutions of its compo-
nents in any basis). The standard ‘eigenstate-eigenvalue link’ semantics for
quantum states dictates that an observable O of a quantum system in state
|ψ(t)〉 possesses a determinate value at time t if and only if O|ψ(t)〉 = o|ψ(t)〉
for some eigenvalue o of O (i.e., if and only if the probability of finding o
in a measurement of O is 1 at time t). Unfortunately, the standard dynam-
ics and semantics for quantum states together give rise to the measurement
problem; they force the conclusion that a cat can be neither alive nor dead,
and, worse, that a competent observer who looks upon such a cat will nei-
ther believe that the cat is alive nor believe it to be dead. The standard way
out of the measurement problem is to keep the standard semantics and tem-
porarily suspend the standard dynamics by invoking the collapse postulate.
According to this postulate, the state vector |ψ(t)〉, representing a composite
interacting ‘measured’ and ‘measuring’ system, stochastically collapses, at
some time t′ during their interaction, into one of |ψ(t′)〉’s components in the
interaction basis. The trouble is that this is not a way out unless one can
specify the physical conditions necessary and sufficient for a measurement
interaction to occur; for surely ‘measurement’ is too ambiguous a concept to
be taken as primitive in a fundamental physical theory.
Collapse theories are designed to cure this defect in the collapse postulate.
They specify the precise physical conditions under which collapses are more or
less likely to occur, without treating ‘measurement’ interactions as different
from other interactions contemplated by quantum theory. Our main focus
shall be on wavefunction collapse theories. These are theories in which the
representation of a state vector |ψ(t)〉 as a function ψ(t, r1, . . . , rN) on the
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configuration space of the system is taken to be fundamental, and a collapse
increases the concentration of the amplitude of ψ(t, r1, . . . , rN) in some region
of configuration space.
Collapse, so construed, faces two obstacles. First, the smaller the re-
gion in which a wavefunction’s amplitude is concentrated by a collapse, the
higher the collapsed state’s dispersion will be in momentum space (by the
uncertainty relation), and hence the more energy the system can possess af-
ter collapse. So wavefunction collapses had better not make a macroscopic
system’s wavefunction too narrow, otherwise the system could spontaneously
heat up in an observable way. Secondly, in order to be empirically adequate,
wavefunction collapse theories need to predict that collapses of a microscopic
system’s wavefunction rarely occur, because the standard Schro¨dinger evolu-
tion of a microscopic system is overwhelmingly confirmed through interfer-
ence experiments. But it is a well-known feature of the Schro¨dinger equation
that it prevents the wavefunction of a closed system of particles from ever de-
veloping a support confined to a bounded region of their configuration space
(except at isolated instants of time)!2 Now if a system’s wavefunction cannot
be made arbitrarily narrow by a collapse, and if it can never be completely
concentrated in a bounded region—i.e., if a system’s wavefunction must vir-
tually always possess ‘tails’ going off to infinity—then the standard semantics
will block the attribution of a determinate location to each particle in the
system, as well as to the position of the system as a whole. For a macro-
scopic system, it would then appear that the wavefunction collapse theorist
has little hope of finally putting the measurement problem to rest. How one
2And this is not simply an artifact of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. Restricting to
the positive energy solutions of the Dirac equation, they all have infinite support (Thaller
[1992]). In fact, this is a consequence of the following much more general result. If the
Hamiltonian generating the time evolution of a free relativistic particle has a spectrum
bounded from below, and the particle is localized to a bounded region at t = 0, then
there is a nonzero probability of finding the particle arbitrarily far away at any later time
(Hegerfeldt [1995]).
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should deal with this problem, known as the wavefunction tails problem, is
the subject of the present note.
In fact there is a standard solution to the tails problem, which Albert
and Loewer ([1996]) have recently argued for at length. The solution is to
weaken the eigenstate-eigenvalue link as regards the position of a particle by
taking a particle to be located in some region of space just in case its wave-
function is almost an eigenstate of being located in that region. Restricting
attention to localizing the particle in a region sidesteps the problem that its
wavefunction can never be infinitely narrow. And taking the high probability
of finding a particle in a region to be sufficient for asserting that it actually
is in that region sidesteps the problem of infinite tails. Specifically, Albert
and Loewer propose a weakened eigenstate-eigenvalue link for position that
they call PosR:
‘Particle x is in region R’ if and only if the proportion of the total
squared amplitude of x’s wave function which is associated with
points in R is greater than or equal to 1− p. (Albert and Loewer
[1996], p. 87)
Albert and Loewer require that p lie somewhere in the interval (0, 0.5) (for
p ≥ 0.5 would allow one to say that a particle lies in disjoint regions); other-
wise, they argue that p may be taken to have any of the small continuum of
values that can underwrite the way we actually use the word ‘located’ ([1996],
p. 90). The obvious generalization of PosR to a multi-particle system would
be (where × denotes Cartesian product):
‘Particle x lies in region Rx and y lies in Ry and z lies in Rz and
. . .’ if and only if the proportion of the total squared amplitude of
ψ(t, r1, . . . , rN) that is associated with points in Rx×Ry×Rz×· · ·
is greater than or equal to 1− p.
We shall call this generalization of PosR, which Albert and Loewer do not
explicitly endorse, the fuzzy link.
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At first glace it would seem that the fuzzy link, with a suitable value for p
selected, promises to yield an unproblematic interpretation of collapse theo-
ries, and allow them to fulfill their goal of representing everyday macroscopic
objects, like cats, as possessing reasonably well-defined locations. However,
Peter Lewis ([1997]) has recently argued that the ‘spontaneous localization’
wavefunction collapse theory of GRW (Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber [1986]),
in virtue of its need to rely on the fuzzy link to solve the tails problem, has
the unacceptable consequence that arithmetic does not apply to ordinary
macroscopic objects. We believe that what Lewis succeeds in showing is that
the GRW theory, interpreted in terms of the fuzzy link, sometimes entails a
failure of conjunction introduction; that is, it entails that there can be certain
physical situations where a proposition A1 is true, A2 is true, . . . , An is true,
yet the conjunction A1 ∧A2 ∧ . . .∧An (or (∀i)Ai) is false. However, we shall
show that the GRW theory itself guarantees that conjunction introduction
can never be experimentally falsified, leaving the applicability of arithmetic
to macroscopic objects intact.
In the next section, 2, we briefly review the essentials of the GRW the-
ory needed for Lewis’ argument, and then spell out the argument itself. In
section 3, we show why the response to Lewis’ argument recently given by
Ghirardi and Bassi ([1999]) is unsuccessful, and consider other possible re-
sponses. Section 4 contains our demonstration that the failure of arithmetic
for macroscopic objects that Lewis alleges (what we prefer to call a failure of
conjunction introduction) can never become manifest in a world governed by
GRW wavefunction collapses. In our final section, 5, we briefly discuss the
larger issue: What epistemic stance should be taken towards interpretations
of quantum theory that are forced to posit ‘anomalies’ which are never made
manifest?
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2 Lewis’s Counting Anomaly
We begin by recalling the ingredients of the GRW theory that are important
to assessing Lewis’ ([1997]) argument and Ghirardi and Bassi’s ([1999]) reply.
According to the GRW theory, the quantum state of an N -particle system
evolves in accordance with Schro¨dinger’s equation except when a ‘hit’ occurs
on one of the particles in the system. When a ‘hit’ occurs on the ith particle,
the total wave function ψ(t, r) for the system (abbreviating (r1, . . . , rN) by
r) instantaneously collapses to:
ψ′(t, r) =
j(x− ri)ψ(t, r)
Ri(x)
. (1)
The jump factor j effecting the hit is taken to be a normalized Gaussian of
relatively narrow width 10−5 cm, and a hit on the ith particle is posited to
occur with probability 10−15 per second, for any i. (Ri(x) is simply a renor-
malization factor, equal to
∫ |jψ|2d3Nr.) The hit center x, specified in j’s first
argument, is randomly chosen with probability distribution |Ri(x)|2d3x. This
ensures that the localization of the probability distribution for the ith parti-
cle to the region surrounding a point x in space occurs with the probability
given by the standard quantum-mechanical Born rule. For the quantum state
of a microscopic system—a system with much less than 1015 particles—the
particles in the system will almost never be hit, so their total wavefunction
will almost never collapse but, rather, will just evolve in accordance with
Schro¨dinger evolution. On the other hand, the GRW theory ensures that the
total wavefunction of a macroscopic system—a system with more than 1015
particles—will collapse very rapidly.
There are some important features of GRW collapse that need to be kept
in mind for what follows. Suppose an ordinary macroscopic object, like a
marble, is in a superposition of different states, where each state corresponds
to the marble being well-localized to a region of space, but the regions, which
we denote by L and R, are widely separated:
ψ(t, r) = cL ψL(t, r) + cR ψR(t, r). (2)
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If one of the particles in the marble is hit (which is virtually inevitable, given
the number of particles in the marble), ψ(t, r) will most likely collapse to a
state which is similar to the state of one of the two terms appearing in (2).
This occurs because the position of each particle in the marble is correlated
to the position of every other particle, which ensures that when one particle
is hit, it is as if the same jump factor were hitting every particle. Thus, if
just one particle i is hit with a jump factor j(x − ri), and if x ∈ L (which
will occur with probability ≈ |cL|2), then the result will be:
ψ′(t, r) = cL j(x− ri)ψL(t, r)/Ri(x) + cR j(x− ri)ψR(t, r)/Ri(x). (3)
Since the region in which ψR is large is, by hypothesis, a region where j is
vanishingly small, the norm of the second term is now very small relative to
the first. Thus a single hit has precipitated an effective collapse of the total
wavefunction ψ(t, r) onto its first term. The collapse is only effective since
the second term of (3) is never zero, and will form part of the residual ‘tails’
of the wavefunction ψ′(t, r) in configuration space3. By contrast, suppose we
have a pair of non-interacting marbles in an unentangled product state:
ψ(t, r, r′) = ψ1(t, r)ψ2(t, r
′). (4)
In this case, any number of hits on the particles in one of the marbles will
leave the other marble’s wavefunction unchanged. For example, a hit on the
ith particle in marble 1 will just produce:
ψ′(t, r, r′) =
j(x− ri)ψ1(t, r)
Ri(x)
ψ2(t, r
′) (5)
(where Ri(x) =
∫ |jψ1|2d3Nr). It follows that in the absence of entanglement
between the marbles, they will each be subject to independent GRW collapse
3Our use of the phrase ‘effective collapse’ in this context should be sharply distin-
guished from the way that phrase is sometimes employed in the context of no-collapse
interpretations to refer to the fact that—due to ‘environmental decoherence’—the state of
a macrosystem can be treated for all practical purposes as if it were no longer involved in
a superposition of macroscopically distinguishable states.
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processes that will preserve the product character of their total wavefunction
for as long as they fail to interact.
We turn now to Lewis’s ([1997]) argument. He first considers a marble
that can be either in or out of a box. The eigenstate of the marble being in
the box is |in〉, while the eigenstate of the marble being outside the box is
|out〉. Suppose the marble starts out in the state
1√
2
(|in〉+ |out〉) (6)
(which would correspond to a wavefunction ψ(t, r) with both
∫
in |ψ|2d3Nr and
∫
out |ψ|2d3Nr equal to 1/2). Lewis observes that GRW’s collapse dynamics
will almost always leave the system in either a state like
a|in〉+ b|out〉, (7)
or a state like
a|out〉+ b|in〉, (8)
where 1 > |a|2 ≫ |b|2 > 0. Applying the eigenstate-eigenvalue link to
either collapsed state, the marble is neither in nor out of the box. But
according to the fuzzy link for |b|2 ≤ p, the marble is either determinately in
or determinately out of the box. Moreover, if we suppose the post-collapse
state of the marble is in fact (7), so that according to the fuzzy link the
marble is in the box, then when one measures the location of such a marble,
one could obtain the result that the marble is out of the box. The probability
of this happening, |b|2, is extremely low, but according to the GRW theory it
could happen. Still, there is nothing contradictory in this state of affairs. One
simply has to accept that very rarely a measurement of a marble’s location
will cause it to jump to a location disjoint from the location it had, according
to the fuzzy link, prior to the measurement. Indeed, even in the absence
of measurement, the marble could well make such a jump spontaneously.
Lewis’s counting anomaly can be seen as an attempt to magnify this unlikely
anomaly to the point of absurdity.
8
Thus, Lewis next considers a system of n non-interacting marbles, each
of which is in a state like (7):
|ψ〉all = (a|in〉1 + b|out〉1)⊗ (a|in〉2+ b|out〉2)⊗ · · ·⊗ (a|in〉n + b|out〉n). (9)
Lewis takes each |in〉i state to refer to localization within a single box which
is the same for all the marbles. He also needs to assume that the marbles are
noninteracting, which can be ensured by making the dimensions of the box
sufficiently large4. When one measures the location of each marble in turn,
the probability that all n marbles will be found to be in the box is
|〈ψ|all |in〉1 ⊗ |in〉2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |in〉n|2 = |an|2 = |a|2n. (10)
Since |a|2 < 1 (notwithstanding that |a|2 could be quite close to 1), |a|2n ≪ 1
for sufficiently large n, which makes it highly unlikely that all the marbles will
be found in the box. Lewis concludes from this that the state |ψ〉all ‘cannot
be one in which all n marbles are in the box, since there is almost no chance
that if one looks one will find them there’ ([1997], p. 318). In other words,
by applying the fuzzy link for |a|2n ≤ p to |ψ〉all, one obtains the result that
not all the marbles are in the box. And this seems to contradict the results
one obtains when one applies the fuzzy link on a marble-by-marble basis,
where one gets the results that marble 1 is in the box, marble 2 is in the box,
and so on through marble n.5
4Alternatively, one could assume that each state |in〉i refers to a separate box, and that
the n boxes, one for each marble, are pairwise widely separated in space.
5Note the similarity between this result and the ‘lottery paradox’. For any particular
ticket holder (in a lottery with a sufficiently large number of tickets) one is inclined to
infer, from the ticket holder’s high probability of losing, that they will in fact lose (cf.
‘this particular marble is in the box’). Yet, if the same inference is made for each ticket
holder in turn, we would apparently arrive at the absurd conclusion that we are certain
that no one will win the lottery (cf. ‘all the marbles are in the box’). But note well:
while we would be wholly within our rights to draw back from the inference from high
probability to certainty that generates the lottery paradox, exercising the same freedom
against Lewis’s counting paradox would mean rejecting the fuzzy link and, consequently,
send the wavefunction collapse theorist right back to the tails problem.
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Actually, as Lewis points out ([1997], p. 321), the contradiction only
holds if one assumes the enumeration principle: ‘if marble 1 is in the box
and marble 2 is in the box and so on through marble n, then all n marbles are
in the box’. This principle is but a special case of conjunction introduction:
if A1 is true, A2 is true, and so on through An, then A1 ∧A2 ∧ . . .∧An (that
is, (∀i)Ai) is true. Thus the fuzzy link, the GRW theory, and conjunction
introduction jointly entail a contradiction. The moral Lewis draws from this
contradiction is that no-collapse interpretations of quantum theory not sub-
ject to the tails problem, such as Bohm’s ([1952]) theory, are to be preferred
over wavefunction collapse theories like GRW’s. We believe this conclusion is
far too quick, so our next task will be to examine some other possible routes
around the contradiction.
3 Can the Counting Anomaly be Avoided?
Recently Ghirardi and Bassi ([1999]) have claimed that Lewis’s contradiction
between the fuzzy link and and the enumeration principle (or conjunction
introduction) in fact fails to arise in the GRW theory. They consider the
system in state |ψ〉all, and point out that it can be rewritten as the following
superposition of 2n macroscopic states:
|ψ〉all = an|in〉1 ⊗ |in〉2 · · · |in〉n + an−1b|out〉1 ⊗ |in〉2 · · · |in〉n
+ an−1b|in〉1 ⊗ |out〉2 · · · |in〉n + · · ·+ an−1b|in〉1 ⊗ |in〉2 · · · |out〉n (11)
+an−2b2|out〉1 ⊗ |out〉2 · · · |in〉n + · · ·+ bn|out〉1 ⊗ |out〉2 · · · |out〉n.
They then write:
The marbles are macroscopic objects, and, as such, they contain
a number of particles of the order of Avogadro’s number. But it is
the most fundamental physical characteristic of the GRW theory
that it forbids the persistence of superpositions of states of this
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kind. In particular for the case under consideration the precise
GRW dynamics will lead in about one millionth of a second to the
suppression of the superposition and the “spontaneous reduction”
of the state [i.e. |ψ〉all] to one of its terms (with the probability
attached to it by its specific coefficient). (Ghirardi and Bassi
[1999], p. 708)
Ghirardi and Bassi go on to argue ([1999], Section 4) that even if we assume
n to be so large that all the mass of the universe is used to constitute the
n marbles, |ψ〉all is still overwhelmingly likely to GRW collapse to the first
term in (11) given how close |a|2 will in fact be to 1 for an object the size of a
marble undergoing GRW collapse. But their main conclusion, with reference
to |ψ〉all, is that ‘it is meaningless to make any statement about the location
of the marbles in such states simply because they cannot persist for “more
than a split second” ’ ([1999], p. 709).
Let us suppose that Ghirardi and Bassi are correct that GRW collapse
will rapidly produce a reduction of the state |ψ〉all to one of the terms in
(11) (setting aside, for the moment, to which term |ψ〉all is most likely to
collapse). Of course, if such a reduction were to occur, it would have to
happen in such a way that the squared modulus of the coefficient of one of
the terms in (11) became large, and the other coefficients became small; for
a perfect collapse to one of (11)’s terms would leave the individual wavefunc-
tions of the marbles without tails. Also recall from Section 2 that, since the
noninteracting marbles begin in the product state |ψ〉all (which is a product
state, notwithstanding the fact that |ψ〉all may be rewritten as in (11)), the
marbles’ final effectively collapsed state must again be a product state. So
no matter what GRW collapses occur in state (11), the final state must have
the form:
|ψ′〉all = (a1|in〉1+ b1|out〉1)⊗ (a2|in〉2+ b2|out〉2)⊗· · ·⊗ (an|in〉n+ bn|out〉n)
(12)
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where all the ai’s and bi’s are nonvanishing. Ghirardi and Bassi’s claim, on
behalf of |ψ′〉all, must then be that when we re-expand |ψ′〉all, as |ψ〉all was
expanded in (11) above, the absolute square of one of the terms’ coefficients
(there will again be 2n terms) will now be ≥ 1− p. However, by hypothesis
we started out in a state |ψ〉all wherein all the squares of the coefficients
in (11) were bounded above by |a|2n, which itself was supposed to be much
less than 1. So the only way for the marbles to end up as Ghirardi and
Bassi claim is that a large number of the marbles in |ψ〉all, in a very short
time, have either their a or b coefficients driven by GRW collapse processes
closer (in absolute square) to 1 than a’s value was. That is, the only way to
make sense of Ghirardi and Bassi’s claim (consistent with Lewis’s standing
assumptions that the marbles form an isolated system and do not interact,
assumptions that entail that the marbles will be subject to independent
GRW collapses that preserve the product character of their total state) is
to suppose that in the final state |ψ′〉all various coefficients, say a1, b2, a3,
etc. will have their absolute squares much closer to 1 than a’s was, yielding a
value |a1|2|b2|2|a3|2 · · · ≥ 1−p that restores consistency with the enumeration
principle.
But herein lies the rub. For the purposes of his argument, Lewis supposed
that the initial product state of the marbles was already one in which |a|2
had been driven by GRW collapse as close to 1 as it can be (a perfectly
legitimate assumption, since if there were no upper limit on |a|2, there would
be no tails problem to begin with). He was then free to choose a sufficiently
large value of n with which to run his argument. It follows that the collapse
scenario Ghirardi and Bassi envisage, in which some of the |a|2’s get still
closer to 1, has already been taken into account by Lewis’s argument, and
cannot supply a basis from which to launch a criticism of that argument.
Here is another way to see the point. Suppose we grant that |ψ〉all very
quickly evolves to a state of form |ψ′〉all. Then Lewis would still be free to
exploit this latter state as the starting point for his argument. He could, first,
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drop from consideration those marbles where |ai|2 < 1 − p. For the marbles
that remain, they will be in a product state |ψ′′〉all again of form (12) where,
now, all the ai’s have absolute squares within p of 1 (and thus each individual
marble will be in the box, according to the fuzzy link). Lewis could, then,
simply consider sufficiently many marbles in a product state formed from
sufficiently many tensor products of |ψ′′〉all with itself in order to guarantee,
yet again, that the probability that they are all in the box is less than or
equal to p!
This leads us to Ghirardi and Bassi’s other criticism of Lewis’s argument.
In effect, they challenge Lewis’s application of the multi-particle fuzzy link
to |ψ〉all (or, if you prefer, to tensor products of |ψ′′〉all with itself) by ques-
tioning whether it would actually be possible to produce enough marbles so
that the probability that they are all in the box in a state like |ψ〉all is less
than or equal to some small number p. They calculate that if each marble
possesses a mass of about 1 gram, which puts precise limits on the value of a,
and if we allow ourselves the mass of the entire universe (≈ 1053 grams) with
which to constitute the marbles, which sets a limit on the value of n, then the
overwhelmingly most likely configuration of the marbles in state |ψ〉all will,
in actual fact, still be the one where they are all in the box. In other words,
under the given assumptions about marbles and our universe, it turns out
that |a|2 ≥ 1 − p for any reasonably small value for p. We see no reason to
doubt this. However, it is at best a contingent fact about our world, since no
matter how close to 1 GRW collapses will make |a|2 for a macroscopic object
like a marble, one could always imagine a sufficiently massive universe where
n is large enough that |a|2n is close to 0 and the contradiction between the
fuzzy link, conjunction introduction, and the GRW theory remains. We be-
lieve a stronger response to Lewis’s counting anomaly would be one in which
the force of the anomaly is muted for reasons internal to the GRW theory
itself. Moreover, although Lewis clearly wants the anomaly to obtain for
macroscopic objects, there would still be something puzzling about its ob-
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taining for microscopic objects like particles. Yet if we replace each marble
with a particle, which will be hit only very rarely, there is no reason internal
to the GRW theory why |a|2 should have to be so close to 1 that |a|2n cannot
be close to 0 for a large number n of particles in our universe.
Where do these shortcomings in Ghirardi and Bassi’s reasoning leave their
claim that |ψ〉all will be ‘transformed immediately into a perfectly reasonable
(from the point of view of the enumeration principle) state’ ([1999], p. 709)?
Let us see. We can either suppose that the marbles are microscopic particles,
or that the universe is sufficiently massive; we shall persist in telling the
story using marbles in the state |ψ〉all (and the product of |ψ′′〉all with itself
enough times would do equally well). Since the marbles are non-interacting
by hypothesis, when one of the particles in a marble is hit, the states of
the other marbles will not be affected. Obviously if no hits produce marbles
jumping out of the box, then the failure of the enumeration principle will
persist. So suppose, instead, that a collapse occurs in such a way that marble
1 jumps out of the box. This is a very rare occurrence, but with enough
marbles, one of them is bound to make the jump, and we lose no generality
in assuming it is marble 1. The state of the system will then be
|ψ〉out1 = (c|in〉1+d|out〉1)⊗(a|in〉2+b|out〉2)⊗· · ·⊗(a|in〉n+b|out〉n), (13)
where |d|2 ≈ |a|2 (supposing, once more, that the value |a|2 is about as close
to 1 as GRW collapse can achieve). Now let A1 denote the proposition that
‘marble 1 is in the box’, A2 that ‘marble 2 is in the box’, and so on. According
to the fuzzy link applied to each marble in state |ψ〉out1 , it is true that marble
1 is not in the box, that marble 2 is in the box, 3 is in the box, and so on
through marble n. By conjunction introduction, then, ¬A1 ∧ A2 ∧ · · · ∧ An
is true. Yet with the fuzzy link applied to all n marbles, this conjunction is
false, since
|〈ψ|out1 |out〉1 ⊗ |in〉2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |in〉n|2 = |dan−1|2 = |d|2|a|2(n−1), (14)
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and, by hypothesis, |d|2|a|2(n−1) ≈ |a|2n ≤ p for sufficiently large n. Thus, the
contradiction still obtains and the initial failure of conjunction introduction
will simply be propagated via GRW evolution into the failure of another
instance of conjunction introduction. This remains true no matter how many
marbles make jumps or how rapidly GRW collapses occur. For at the moment
after any number of jumps have occurred, there will always remain some
conjunction relative to which conjunction introduction fails. The conclusion,
we think, is inevitable: GRW collapse evolution in fact cannot suppress the
failure of conjunction introduction in a sufficiently large isolated system of
non-interacting marbles that evolve from a product state.
There are at least two other possible strategies one might adopt to avoid
Lewis’s counting anomaly in the GRW theory. Both strategies involve mod-
ifying the fuzzy link.
One route around Lewis’s counting anomaly might be to employ different
values for the fuzzy link’s p: one value, p, when the fuzzy link is applied to an
individual marble’s probability distribution, and another value, pall, when
the link is applied to their total distribution as determined by |ψ〉all. For any
range of values in the interval (0, 0.5) that one believes it is necessary to insist
upon in order to underwrite our uses of the term ‘located’, one could always
make sure both p and pall are chosen from within one’s preferred range in
such a way that (1−p)n ≥ 1−pall. If, then, each of the marbles has at least
1− p of its probability concentrated within the box, i.e. if |a|2 ≥ 1− p, then
each will get counted as actually in the box, and the conjunction of all those
assertions will have the minimum necessary probability of 1 − pall for it to
be counted as true as well! On the other hand, if |a|2 < 1 − p, so that no
single marble is in the box, or if |a|2n < 1 − pall, so that they are not all in
the box, then the issue of a failure of conjunction introduction does not arise.
Unfortunately, this clever strategy simply resurrects the tails problem. To
guard against failures of conjunction introduction, one would always need to
choose p so that (1 − p)n ≥ 1 − pall > 0.5. But this means that as n grows
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large, p must be chosen closer and closer to zero no matter what value is
assumed for pall. Moreover, as we have seen, there will be always some value,
|a|2, close to 1 such that GRW collapses cannot localize the marbles to the
box with a higher probability than |a|2 (and this would also be true were the
marbles replaced by particles). Therefore, we could consider a sufficiently
large value of n such that one is forced by the inequality (1 − p)n > 0.5
to choose a p satisfying |a|2 < 1 − p. In that case, though no failure of
conjunction introduction ensues, the fuzzy link will dictate that no marble
will be in the box. So no matter how well GRW collapses can concentrate
the marbles’ wavefunctions in the box, we would be forced to conclude that
no marble can be in the box, returning us right back to the tails problem.
Second, one might argue that the correct way to resolve the tails problem
is to endorse just PosR—the fuzzy link applied only on an individual par-
ticle basis. One could then take facts about the joint positions of systems
of particles, like marbles and collections of marbles, to supervene directly on
facts about the positions of individual particles, rather than on their total
wavefunction. Albert and Loewer themselves only formulate the fuzzy link
for individual particles, and their willingness to suppose that ‘the value of
the cat’s aliveness is determined by the positions of the particles that make
it up’ ([1996], p. 86) suggests that they might prefer this strategy. Cer-
tainly this strategy would allow one to assert that all the marbles are in the
box, notwithstanding their total state |ψ〉all. However, since |ψ〉all is almost
an eigenstate of ‘all the marbles are in the box’ being false, this strategy
would require that the wavefunction collapse theorist not simply weaken the
eigenstate-eigenvalue link between truth and probability 1, but sever this
link entirely. And if one is willing to entertain the thought that events in
a quantum world can happen without being mandated or made overwhelm-
ingly likely by the wavefunction, then it is no longer clear why one should
need to solve the measurement problem by collapsing wavefunctions! An-
other reason not to restrict to PosR alone is that it seems arbitrary to apply
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a semantic rule for quantum states to a single-particle system, but not to a
multi-particle system. Indeed, to the extent that one supposes there to be
a plausible intuitive connection between an event’s having high probability
according to a theory, and the event actually occurring, one is hard-pressed
to resist the intuition in the multi-particle case. Finally, it is not clear how
one could even make the distinction between PosR and the (full) fuzzy link
in more sophisticated theories, like the ‘continuous spontaneous localization’
theory of Ghirardi, Grassi, and Pearle ([1990]), where talk of particles is
replaced by talk of systems in near eigenstates of local mass density.
Even if one does not regard the above considerations as decisive against
modifying the fuzzy link, neither Lewis nor Ghirardi and Bassi question
this link, and we shall argue in the next section that the price of some-
times abandoning conjunction introduction is not near as high as Lewis por-
trays. But lest one think that conjunction introduction is an analytic truth,
it is worth pointing out that abandoning analogous principles in the con-
text of the interpretation of quantum theory is not unprecedented. In the
quantum logic that Kochen and Specker ([1967]) advocate, conjunctions of
quantum-mechanically incompatible propositions are not syntactically well-
formed, and in Bell’s ([1986]) quantum logic, conjunction introduction is
an invalid inference rule. Moreover, as Clifton ([1996], p. 386) points out,
various modal interpretations deny property composition, a principle which
roughly says that if system S1 has some property and system S2 has some
property, then system S1+S2 has the corresponding joint property. Property
composition can be seen as a version of conjunction introduction, and note
that the ‘conjuncts’, in this case, are compatible.
But, it will be argued: so much the worse for quantum logics and modal
interpretations! However, as Albert and Loewer ([1996], p. 87) point out,
even before multi-particle systems are considered, the GRW theory, inter-
preted via the PosR rule, violates the principle of property intersection: that
if particle x lies in region ∆, and x lies in ∆′, then x must lie in ∆∩∆′. The
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violation of this principle is an easy consequence of PosR’s identification of
‘x lying in ∆’ with ‘x having a probability of at least 1-p of being found in
∆’. And it is at least arguable that once property intersection fails, so must
conjunction introduction—at least if we want ‘x lying in ∆’ to mean ‘no part
of x lies outside of ∆’. For if no part of x lies outside of ∆, and no part lies
outside of ∆′, then, in particular, no part of x lies inside ∆ but outside ∆′,
nor does any part of x lie inside ∆′ but outside ∆. By conjunction intro-
duction, then, it follows that no part of x lies outside of ∆ ∩∆′, i.e., that x
lies in ∆ ∩ ∆′, and we have derived property intersection. (Clifton ([1996],
pp. 381-2) gives this same argument to highlight the import of property
intersection’s violation in Healey’s modal interpretation.)
We are not suggesting by these remarks that anomalies, such as the fail-
ure of conjunction introduction, should simply be swept under the carpet.
Indeed, Albert and Loewer take a major part of their task to be to provide
reasons for thinking that with a sufficiently small value chosen for p in PosR,
violations of property intersection ‘aren’t going to be worth bothering about’
([1996], p. 89). Our final task will be to make the same kind of point in rela-
tion to Lewis’ multiple-particle failure of conjunction introduction (though,
as we have seen above, playing with the value of p will be of no help).
4 Is the Counting Anomaly Ever Manifest?
Recall that Lewis presents his argument as demonstrating a failure of the
enumeration principle. He gives the following argument for why we should
not give up this principle:
If we want to maintain that the enumeration principle breaks
down at some point, then, we must maintain that the process
of counting marbles breaks down—that counting cannot be ap-
plied to sufficiently large systems of marbles. Since counting is
the foundation of arithmetic, this is tantamount to saying that
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arithmetic does not apply to sufficiently large systems of marbles
[italics ours]. (Lewis [1997], p. 321)
Lewis then argues, and we agree, that the cost of holding that arithmetic does
not apply to large systems of marbles is too high. But we do not agree that
Lewis has established the conditional that we italicized above. The trouble is
that Lewis fails to operationalize the process of counting marbles by explic-
itly modelling the process itself in terms of collapsing GRW wavefunctions.
Indeed, by calling the failure at issue a failure of the enumeration principle,
with all the operational connotations of the term ‘enumeration’, Lewis fails
to keep the failure of conjunction introduction distinct from its empirical fal-
sification. Moreover, taking the objects at issue to be macroscopic marbles
conveys the impression that the relevant failure of ‘enumeration’ is somehow
already manifest in state |ψ〉all, but that is only the case if we allow the enu-
merator the powers of Maxwell’s demon. Lewis shows signs of being aware
of this concern, when he writes (just before the remarks quoted above):
To deny the enumeration principle, we must deny that if we put
marble 1 in the box, and we put marble 2 in the box, and so
on through marble n, then there are n marbles in the box. This
process of putting marbles in a box is essentially one of counting
the marbles [italics ours].
However, if marbles are ‘put into’ the box one-by-one, presumably interac-
tions between marble placing devices and marbles will have to take place.
But then it is no longer clear how one could thereby prepare the state |ψ〉all,
which presupposes that the marbles are not entangled in any way with each
other or their environment. In any case, rather than seeking to make Lewis’s
‘putting’ metaphor physically concrete, we shall simply grant that |ψ〉all has
been prepared by some means and, instead, ask whether the marbles’ (or
particles’) instantiation of a failure of conjunction introduction can ever be-
come manifest to a physical observer who takes it upon herself to tally them
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up. Our answer is ‘No’, and it will be clear that our considerations also go
through for a system in state |ψ〉out1 and in any other of the states to which
|ψ〉all (or relevantly similar product states of micro- or macroscopic objects)
can evolve.
The most straightforward way to manifest a failure of conjunction intro-
duction for a system in state |ψ〉all would be to empirically establish the
truth of each of A1, A2, . . . , An, together with an independent empirical test
of the truth of ¬(A1 ∧A2 ∧ · · · ∧An).
An ideal measurement of whether marble 1 is in the box would correlate
orthogonal states of a macroscopic measuring apparatus to the |in〉 and |out〉
states of the marble. Since this must be done for all n marbles, n apparatuses
must be used. The marbles/apparatuses system will evolve from the state
[(a|in〉1+b|out〉1)⊗· · ·⊗(a|in〉n+b|out〉n)]⊗|ready〉M1⊗· · ·⊗|ready〉Mn (15)
to the state
(a|in〉1|‘in’〉M1 + b|out〉1|‘out’〉M1)⊗ · · · ⊗ (a|in〉n|‘in’〉Mn + b|out〉n|‘out’〉Mn).
(16)
Since |b|2 ≤ p, the fuzzy link dictates that each apparatus records that its
marble is in the box. This procedure does not yet qualify as a counting
procedure, since we have not yet modelled an apparatus which records how
many marbles are in the box. One might think that the information about
each individual marble in the marble apparatuses, which could be further
correlated to different memory stores in an observer’s brain, could simply be
combined ‘in thought’ to get direct information about how many marbles are
in the box. However, if we are not simply going to beg the question against
verifying the enumeration principle, acquiring information about the marble
count must itself be modelled in the GRW theory by a further interaction
with the marbles/apparatuses system or within the observer’s brain.
Let us turn, then, to a generic counting procedure that will establish how
many marbles are in the box. No doubt there are many ways to implement
20
counting physically, but the general scheme will need to involve a measure-
ment on the marbles/apparatuses system that is the equivalent of asking the
question: ‘How many marbles are in the box?’. Let O be an observable with
n+ 1 eigenvalues oi, where the oi-eigenspace of the operator associated with
O is the subspace spanned by all the terms in the superposition (16) which
have as coefficient aibn−i. Thus, a system in an oi-eigenstate of O is one
where exactly i of the n marbles are in the box. Consider a measurement
of the observable O on a system in state (16). After the measurement, the
system is in the state
|ψ〉count = an|φ〉out0 |‘O = n’〉M + an−1b|φ〉out1 |‘O = n− 1’〉M (17)
+ · · ·+ bn|φ〉outn |‘O = 0’〉M ,
where
|φ〉out0 = |in〉1|‘in’〉M1|in〉2|‘in’〉M2 · · · |in〉n|‘in’〉Mn
|φ〉out1 = |out〉1|‘out’〉M1|in〉1|‘in’〉M2 · · · |in〉n|‘in’〉Mn
+|in〉1|‘in’〉M1|out〉1|‘out’〉M2 · · · |in〉n|‘in’〉Mn
...
+|in〉1|‘in’〉M1|in〉1|‘in’〉M2 · · · |out〉n|‘out’〉Mn
...
|φ〉outn = |out〉1|‘out’〉M1|out〉2|‘out’〉M2 · · · |out〉n|‘out’〉Mn .
Since |a|2n ≤ p, by the fuzzy link it is not the case that all n marbles are
in the box. However, each individual marble is still in the box, since for all
i, |〈ψ|count|in〉i|2 ≥ 1 − p. Thus, we have a violation of the enumeration
principle and hence conjunction introduction.
But this does not mean that a failure of the rules of counting has now
become manifest! The state |ψ〉count is highly unstable given the GRW
dynamics, since we see from (17) that it is an entangled superposition of
states of macroscopic systems, where the various terms of (17) markedly
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differ as to the location of the pointer on M ’s dial that registers the value
of O. Thus, the GRW dynamics dictates that it is very likely that the total
system will effectively collapse onto one of the terms in (17), and that it will
do so very quickly, given how many particles in M , the Mi apparatuses, and
the marbles have the potential to be hit6. If the effective collapse is onto the
state |φ〉out0|‘O = n’〉M , then clearly no failure of conjunction introduction
becomes manifest, since the results of the various individual apparatuses in
that state are in agreement with M . What if the system effectively collapses
onto some other term of (17), such as |φ〉out1 |‘O = n − 1’〉M? In this case,
since |φ〉out1 is itself an entangled state, since its terms (pairwise) differ
as to location of at least one of the marbles, and since the Mi apparatuses
and marbles are macroscopic (or, if we are enumerating particles instead of
marbles: since their number is extremely large), there will a further quick,
effective collapse to one of |φ〉out1 ’s terms. Suppose, for example, that the
total state (effectively) ends up as
(|out〉1|‘out’〉M1|in〉2|‘in’〉M2 · · · |in〉n|‘in’〉Mn)|‘O = n− 1’〉M . (18)
Then once again the results of the individual apparatuses are in agreement
with M ’s registration of the ‘in’ count as n−1, and no failure of conjunction
introduction has become manifest.
The same conclusion holds no matter what ‘in’ countM ends up register-
ing. And if we think, again, of our observer, she might well come to believe
that not all the marbles are in the box by looking at the pointer of the M
apparatus and not finding the result ‘O = n’. Whereas before looking she
6What is important here is that the total number of particles involved in (17)’s en-
tangled state is sufficiently macroscopic. Thus, the macroscopic apparatuses Mi and M
could be replaced by single particles, whose positions act as the measurement pointers,
and GRW dynamics would still guarantee effective collapse to one of the terms in (17).
(And if, further, the collection of marbles is replaced by a collection of particles sufficiently
large to produce Lewis’s counting anomaly, their number will also more than likely suffice
to produce the same sort of effective collapse of (17).)
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might have held the belief, for each individual marble, that it is in the box,
she could now, if the system quickly evolved to (18), believe that marble 1
is out of the box, each of the others are in the box, and that there are n− 1
marbles in total in the box. She had no empirical justification for forming
any belief about the ‘in’ count prior to totalling up the marbles. But upon
totalling them up, she will have to initiate a process that amounts to the
same thing as setting up the measurement interaction with M and looking
at its final pointer reading. It will then be a consequence of her instantiating
this process that its outcome in fact agrees with her most current beliefs
about the individual marbles!
This conclusion is inescapable even if we allow the observer to ‘form
her own opinion’ about the marble count without bothering to look at the
pointer’s location on M ’s dial, so long as we model the observer’s opinion
forming process within the GRW theory. Of course, we do not presume to
know the contingent details of brain physiology that would be needed for a
complete GRW model. However, it suffices to assume that whatever brain
interactions instantiate ‘forming opinions about marble counts’, that process
is veridical in the following sense. If, prior to making a judgement about the
marble count, the observer were in the state
|φ〉out0 |‘count?’〉 = |in〉1|‘in’〉M1|in〉2|‘in’〉M2 · · · |in〉n|‘in’〉Mn|‘count?’〉 (19)
—with the different Mi states correlated to seperate memory stores in her
brain, and |‘count?’〉 denoting the initial state of that part of her brain that
stores arithmetical judgements—then, afterwards, she should be in the state
|φ〉out0 |‘The count is n’〉; (20)
and, mutatis mutandis, for
|φ〉out1 |‘The count is n− 1’〉, . . . , |φ〉outn|‘The count is 0’〉. (21)
Thus, if we make the minimal assumption that our observer would be com-
petent to form opinions about marble counts when each individual marble
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is completely localized (i.e., localized according to the standard eigenstate-
eigenvalue link) either inside or outside of the box, it follows that her brain
will instantiate exactly the same interaction with the marbles that we have
supposed is instantiated byM , and, hence, that exactly the same conclusions
that we drew above apply. To put it the other way around: the only way to
arrange things so that our observer could falsify the enumeration principle
would be to suppose that she was never a competent enumerator to begin
with!7
We have shown that, if one first measures the marbles individually, and
then enumerates the collection as a whole, no failure of conjunction intro-
duction can become manifest; the process of counting marbles cannot break
down. Alternatively, one can consider what happens if one first measures the
system as a whole, and then the marbles individually. After O is measured,
the marbles/M-apparatus system ends up in a state like that of |ψ〉count,
except without the states of the apparatuses M1 through Mn. As before,
since this is now an entangled state, the system will effectively collapse onto
a state such as
|out〉1|in〉2 · · · |in〉n|‘O = n− 1’〉M . (22)
When the locations of each marble are now measured individually, the system
will in all likelihood end up effectively in state (18), and thus no failure of
conjunction introduction becomes manifest. Since the collapse to (18) is only
effective, it is also possible, albeit highly unlikely, for the system to further
evolve from being effectively (18) to being effectively some other state, like
(|in〉1|‘in’〉M1 · · · |in〉n|‘in’〉Mn)|‘O = n’〉M (23)
7To further underscore the point that this conclusion is robust under differing assump-
tions about brain physiology, note that our considerations remain valid even when we
suppose that our observer is like Albert’s ([1992], Figure 7.15) science-fictional character
‘John-2’—capable of registering information about the outside world in the state of a sin-
gle brain particle. For, as observed in the previous footnote, it is only the sum total of all
the particles in M , the Mi’s, and the marbles (or particles) being counted that needs to
be macroscopic.
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so that marble 1 jumps back in the box. But, even in such an unlikely
scenario, the various apparatuses will still be in agreement at the end of the
day; no failure of conjunction introduction is manifest. And, again, one could
run through the same kind of treatment within the brain of an observer.
By considering cases like this, the general strategy of our argument be-
comes apparent. To manifest a failure of conjunction introduction, one has
to get an (animate or inanimate) apparatus which measures the system as a
whole appropriately correlated with the system, and one has to get (animate
or inanimate) apparatuses which measure the locations of each marble ap-
propriately correlated with each marble. Once all that is done, the requisite
entanglement between the marbles (or particles) will be established and the
dynamics of the GRW theory will guarantee that the system will either be in,
or almost instantaneously evolve to, a state where the various apparatuses
are in agreement and no failure of arithmetic is ever manifest. The strength
of this response to Lewis’s counting anomaly is that it applies no matter how
large we suppose the universe to be, and it applies just as well to counting
particles as it does to counting marbles.
5 Is Suppressing the Manifestation of Anoma-
lies Enough?
We have seen that the GRW theory, together with the fuzzy link, entails
that conjunction introduction can fail for multi-particle systems. We also
noted that, even for a single particle, there is the anomaly that property
intersection can fail. Moreover, quantum systems can instantaneously jump
between disjoint regions of space, though for a macrosystem this will virtually
never happen.
To this list, we must also add that full blown action-at-a-distance can be
instantiated at the microlevel. Consider two non-interacting particles (not
marbles), L and R, each of which can either be in or out of a box, but their
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boxes are widely separated in space, on the left and right. Suppose that at
some time t their joint state happens to be:
a|in〉L|in〉R + b|out〉L|out〉R, (24)
with |b|2 ≤ p. Consider a sufficiently small time interval T around t over
which the free Schro¨dinger evolution of the particles does not invalidate the
inequality |b|2 ≤ p. We can also suppose that during T the state (24) does
not GRW collapse, because the probability for hits is negligibly low with
only two particles in the system. Then, applying the fuzzy link to (24),
both particles are determinately in their boxes throughout the interval T .
However, suppose that during T the left-hand particle were subjected to a
measurement of whether it is in or out of its box, producing the state:
a|in〉L|‘in’〉ML|in〉R + b|out〉L|‘out’〉ML|out〉R. (25)
Since ML is macroscopic, the probability of GRW collapse during T is now
extremely high. Of course, it is most likely that an effective collapse to the
first term of (25) would occur. But it is certainly not impossible that the
effective collapse would be to the second term, in which case the particle
on the right, according to the fuzzy link, would have to switch from being
determinately in its box to being determinately out. Notice that such a
switch would have to have been brought about through action-at-a-distance,
since in the absence of a measurement interaction on the distant left-hand
particle (the ‘action’), the right-hand particle (‘at-a-distance’) would have
remained in its box during T . (We are, of course, well aware that even when
|b|2 6≤ p there could be a jump in the state of the right-hand particle; but
that jump would not be from one determinate state of affairs to another as
interpreted via the fuzzy link.)
Is the fact that the GRW theory contains within it ‘mechanisms’ that
suppress the manifestation of fuzzy link anomalies sufficient reason to con-
tinue to take the theory seriously? A sceptic might incline towards the view
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set forth in Reichenbach’s ([1948]) ‘The Principle of Anomaly in Quantum
Mechanics’ that one should always impose on any interpretation of quantum
theory the requirement that there be no action-at-a-distance behind quantum
phenomena. More generally, Reichenbach appears to argue against attribut-
ing an object any kind of behaviour that is radically different from the way
the object manifests itself to us:
Speaking of unobserved objects is meaningful only if such ob-
jects are related to observed ones. If we say that a tree exists
while we do not look at it, or while nobody looks at it, we inter-
polate an unobserved object between observables; and we select
the interpolated object in such a way that it allows us to carry
through the principle of causality. For instance, we observe that
a tree casts a shadow; when we see a tree shadow without look-
ing at the tree, we say that the tree is still in its place and thus
satisfy the principle of causality. More precisely speaking, we se-
lect an interpolation which makes the causal laws of unobserved
objects identical with those of observed ones. This qualification
is necessary because otherwise we could interpolate different ob-
jects and construct for them peculiar causal laws; for example,
we could assume that the unobserved tree splits into two trees,
which however cast only one shadow. It is the postulate of iden-
tical causality for observed and unobserved objects which makes
statements about unobserved objects definite. . . The postulate it-
self is neither true nor false, but a rule which we use to simplify
our language. ([1948], p. 341)
One can ignore the conventionalist overtones of this passage and still agree
that occurrences behind the phenomena should be described, as far as is
possible, in a way that is continuous with the manifest world.
On the other hand, in the course of a discussion of the confusion between
the instrumental and objective interpretation of wavefunctions, Reichenbach
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opines: ‘The confusion of interpretations is one of the weak spots of the
customary discussion of quantum-mechanical issues; it has blinded the eyes
of some physicists to the extent that they do not see the causal anomalies
unavoidable for every interpretation [italics ours]’ ([1948], p. 345). Indeed,
from what we have said (at the end of Section 3) about no-collapse inter-
pretations, it would not be hard to make a case that no interpretation of
quantum theory can be entirely anomaly-free. The more important issue,
it seems to us, is the status of an alleged anomaly, i.e., how it should be
interpreted.
The GRW theory, considered as a theory about the evolution of wavefunc-
tions, is perfectly consistent with classical logic and arithmetic. It is only
once we relate wavefunctions to our ordinary language via the fuzzy link
that all the anomalies we have discussed can crop up. This suggests that one
should sharply distinguish the fundamental ontology of the GRW theory, viz.
wavefunctions evolving and collapsing in configuration space, from the im-
plications the fuzzy link has for how we are licensed to talk about a world
governed by the GRW theory. Fuzzy link semantics, on this view, does not
add anything of ontological import to the GRW theory, but simply provides
a way of mapping our ‘particle’ language onto a theory whose fundamental
language concerns wavefunctions. The fuzzy link, for some particular value
of p, would then have something of the status of a postulate that (to echo
Reichenbach above) ‘is neither true nor false, but a rule which we use to
simplify our language’.
Certainly the argument for this construal of the fuzzy link (apparently
endorsed by Albert and Loewer ([1996], p. 91)) needs to be more fully
developed. But, supposing it can be, we do not see any reason, in the case
of wavefunction collapse theories, not to answer ‘Yes’ to the question in the
title of this section.
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